The Vanishing Body of Disability Law: Power and the Making of the Impaired Subject by Beaudry, Jonas-Sébastien
Canadian Journal of Family Law 
Volume 31 
Number 1 Remembering Professor Judith 
Mosoff 
2018 
The Vanishing Body of Disability Law: Power and the Making of 
the Impaired Subject 
Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/can-j-fam-l 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry, "The Vanishing Body of Disability Law: Power and the Making of the Impaired 
Subject" (2018) 31:1 Can J Fam L 7. 
The University of British Columbia (UBC) grants you a license to use this article under the Creative Commons 
Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. If you wish to use this 
article or excerpts of the article for other purposes such as commercial republication, contact UBC via the 
Canadian Journal of Family Law at cdnjfl@interchange.ubc.ca 
 THE VANISHING BODY OF DISABILITY 
LAW: POWER AND THE MAKING OF 
THE IMPAIRED SUBJECT* 
 
Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry** 
 
The influence of disability studies on legal scholarship is 
most visible in the social model, which claims that people 
are not disabled because of their bodily impairments, but 
by society in its refusal to accommodate their 
impairments.  
 
However, a modest but growing discourse within 
disability studies argues that the notion of impairment, in 
addition to disability, is socially constructed. This article 
aims to bring this problematized conception of 
impairment, informed by Michel Foucault’s conception of 
power, into contact with legal scholarship. Judith 
Mosoff’s sensibility about the role of impairments in the 
legal treatment of disabled people illustrates this critical 
                                                 
*  This title was inspired by Bill Hughes & Kevin Paterson, “The Social 
Model of Disability and the Disappearing Body: Towards a Sociology 
of Impairment” (1997) 12:3 Disability & Society 325, and by a sub-
heading (“Foucault's vanishing body”) in Chris Shilling, The Body 
and Social Theory, 2nd ed (London: Sage Publications, 2003) at 69. 
**  Assistant Professor at the Peter A. Allard School of Law at the 
University of British Columbia. I thank my research assistants, Gabe 
Boothroyd and Ian Heckman, for their meticulous editorial support, 
as well as the anonymous reviewers and the editors of this special 
issue, Professors Susan Boyd and Isabel Grant, for their helpful 
suggestions. 
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outlook, which has the potential to guide scholarship and 
legal reforms. For instance, in the context of family law, 
those reforms could affect the evaluation of a person’s 
fitness to parent or her right to childcare support.  
 
The first part of this article makes a prima facie case for a 
critical ontology of impairment and the second part 
provides theoretical foundations for such a practice. I use 
Supreme Court of Canada case law to illustrate how 
impairments are typically naturalized and to begin 
challenging impairment-based identities and detaching 
disability from impairment.  
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 “By definition, of course, we believe the 
person with a stigma is not quite human. . . . 
We construct a stigma-theory, an ideology 
to explain his inferiority and account for the 
danger he represents, sometimes 
rationalizing an animosity based on other 
differences. . . . We use specific stigma 
terms such as cripple, bastard, moron in our 
daily discourse as a source of metaphor and 
imagery, typically without giving thought to 
the original meaning. We tend to impute a 
wide range of imperfections on the basis of 
the original one . . .”1  
 
1. RECLAIMING THE IMPAIRED BODY IN 
DISABILITY LAW 
 
WHAT CAN A CRITICAL ONTOLOGY OF 
IMPAIRMENT DO FOR LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP? 
 
“Our bodily experience”, Alfred North Whitehead wrote, 
“[is] so habitual and so completely a matter of course that 
we rarely mention it. No one ever says, Here am I, and I 
have brought my body with me.”2 The failure to consider 
the body as a site of power and agency is widespread in 
Western thought, from modernity’s Cartesianism to post-
structuralism’s “dissolution of matter as a contemporary 
                                                 
1  Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled 
Identity (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963) at 5.  
2  Alfred Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Free Press, 
1968) at 114. 
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category.” 3  Phenomenology 4  and “body studies” 5  are 
important exceptions but remain peripheral to mainstream 
disability studies and legal scholarship.6  Judith Mosoff, 
                                                 
3  Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex 
(New York: Routledge, 1993) at 27 [emphasis in original].  
4  Phenomenology is a philosophical discipline (associated with 
Edmond Husserl, Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre, amongst others) 
that could be approximately defined by its objects of enquiry 
(consciousness or objects as experienced) or as a practice of 
suspending our focus on (the existence of) the thing-in-itself (the 
thing “behind” our perception) and shifting our attention to objects-
as-experienced, or to our perceptual capacities. It notably included 
(e.g., in Merleau-Ponty’s work) a focus on the role that our body 
plays in experiencing the world and in constituting our consciousness 
(David Woodruff Smith, "Phenomenology", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N 
Zalta (ed), online: Stanford <plato.stanford.edu>).  
5  Body studies can be defined as an interdisciplinary field that 
investigates how human bodies are culturally inscribed and 
represented; it pays particular attention to the social construction of 
bodies and naturalization of such constructs, though it can also deal 
with our representations of the “natural” body: Margo Demello, Body 
Studies: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2014) at xvi. 
Although it has earlier roots, and has come to include a variety of 
disciplines (anthropology, sociology, philosophy, sports studies, 
cultural studies, phenomenology, and dance), the field of “body 
studies” is relatively recent and is probably best associated with a 
“corporeal turn” in sociological scholarship (seminally illustrated by 
the work of Bryan Turner) in the eighties onward. For a survey of 
those developments by a leading scholar in the field, see Chris 
Shilling, “The Rise of Body Studies and the Embodiment of Society: 
A Review of the Field” (2016) 2:1 Horizons in Humanities & Social 
Sciences: An International Refereed Journal 1.   
6  I list, infra note 11, a body of scholarship within disability studies 
that has integrated this concern for the body as a site of governance or 
an object of cultural construction. While feminist legal scholars have 
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however, provides an example of legal scholarship that 
interrogates this widespread naturalization and erasure of 
the body. In a discussion of the data collected about 
disability-related complaints within a human rights 
framework, she noted how severely cognitively impaired 
individuals were not deemed as full subjects under human 
rights law. In fact, institutionalized and psychiatrically-
diagnosed bodies fell under a different (e.g., paternalistic) 
jurisdiction.7  
 
As Mosoff notes, courts sometimes justify their 
refusal to intervene because diseases and impairments lie 
beyond their jurisdictions. It is one thing to reject 
disability claims because courts do not want to usurp the 
political role of the state or the professional role of 
medical experts. It is another to preclude “impaired 
persons” from concerns of fairness, equality, dignity, and 
freedom, all of which are within the jurisdictions of legal 
actors. When legal actors believe that “impaired persons” 
                                                                                               
long paid attention to the control of women’s bodies (e.g., its 
sexuality, its procreative capacities), the problematization of 
impairment as a social construct is rarely theorized (exceptions 
include Judith Mosoff’s work, as well as Hall, infra note 15; Kristin 
Savell, “Sex and the Sacred: Sterilization and Bodily Integrity in 
English and Canadian Law” (2004) 49:4 McGill LJ 1093; and Sheila 
Wildeman, “Agonizing Identity in Mental Health Law and Policy” in 
two parts: (2015) 38:2 Dal LJ 619 and (2016) 39:1 Dal LJ 147. The 
only work I know that systematically theorizes the construction of 
bodies in legal thought is Alan Hydes, Bodies of Law (New Jersey: 
Princeton, 1997)).  
7  Judith Mosoff, “Is the Human Rights Paradigm 'Able' to Include 
Disability: Who’s In? Who Wins? What? Why?” (2000) 26:1 
Queen’s LJ 225 at 263. As this example suggests, I use “body” in a 
broad way meant to encompass mental features as well.  
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lie outside of their jurisdictions, they assume that their 
“impairments” are value-neutral, power-independent, 
biological facts. They implicitly endorse a naturalistic 
view of the body, generally, and of impairments, 
specifically. Such naturalistic views hold that:  
 
Inequalities in material wealth, legal rights 
and political power are not socially 
constructed, contingent and reversible, but 
are given, or at the very least legitimized, by 
the determining power of the biological 
body.8 
 
This article takes issue with the assumption that 
impairments are natural facts that fairly underlie disability 
claims and justifiably delineate social expectations related 
to “disabled people”. Instead, this article suggests that we 
conceive of impairments as social constructions 
expressing power over people by transforming them into 
“impaired subjects”, whose freedom can be curtailed due 
to their impairment, and whose impairment can only be 
contested on a medical basis. Whereas the disabled legal 
subject can contest her marginalization or oppression, the 
impaired legal subject has few options for choosing or 
contesting the legal frameworks applied to her. This 
position follows a modest but growing body of literature 
within disability studies that problematizes the “absent 
presence”9 of impairment.10 
                                                 
8  Shilling, supra note 1 at 37.  
9  Shilling, supra note 1 at 8; Tom Shakespeare & Nicholas Watson, 
“The Social Model of Disability: An Outdated Ideology?” (2001) 2 
Research in Social Science & Disability 9 at 14.  
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QUESTIONING THE NATURALIZATION OF THE 
CONCEPT OF IMPAIRMENT IN DISABILITY 
LAW 
 
In her article Motherhood, Madness, and Law, Mosoff 
introduces her readers to Shirley, a client discharged 
following a psychiatric hospitalization, and who 
eventually surrendered custody of her child after “social 
workers, public health nurses, and psychiatrists . . . 
strongly suggested that her mental health impede[d] her 
                                                                                               
10  Here is a representative selection of this sub-field, in chronological 
order: William Ray Arney & Bernard Bergen, “The Anomaly, the 
Chronic Patient and the Play of Medical Power” (1983) 5 Sociology 
of Health & Illness 1; Helen Liggett, “Stars are Not Born: An 
Interpretive Approach to the Politics of Disability” (1988) 3 
Disability, Handicap & Society 263; Alden Chadwick, “Knowledge, 
Power and the Disability Discrimination Bill” (1996) 11 Disability & 
Society 25; Margrit Shildrick & Janet Price, “Breaking the 
Boundaries of the Broken Body” (1996) 2 Body & Society 93; 
Hughes & Paterson, supra note 1; Shelley Tremain, “On the 
Government of Disability” (2001) 27:4 Social Theory & Practice 617; 
Mairian Corker & Tom Shakespeare, eds, Disability/Postmodernity: 
Embodying Disability Theory (London: Bloomsbury, 2002); Shelley 
Tremain, ed, Foucault and the Government of Disability (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2015); Margrit Shildrick, Dangerous 
Discourses of Disability, Subjectivity and Sexuality (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); David T Mitchell, The Biopolitics of 
Disability: Neoliberalism, Ablenationalism, and Peripheral 
Embodiment (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015). There 
are earlier statements of the view that impairments are socially 
constructed within other theoretical frameworks, such as Robert 
Scott’s The Making of Blind Men (New York: Routledge, 1981), who 
describe blindness as a “social role” that sight-impaired people “must 
learn how to play”.  
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from being a good mother.”11 This case was not isolated, 
and Mosoff criticized both the authority of psychiatrist 
experts to determine whether women were able to 
perform the role of mothers and the deference of courts 
toward medical expertise. Influenced by Michel Foucault, 
she writes:  
[W]hat unites the people who are associated 
with psychiatry, psychology, and related 
disciplines is that they are all seen in law to 
have important expertise which assists in 
explaining how the human mind works, how 
a particular mind works, and how 
personality is formed. In exercising the 
accompanying power these professionals all 
perform functions of surveillance and 
control as designated state agents in modern 
society.12  
Mosoff concludes that judges ought to scrutinize 
medical evidence more circumspectly when considering 
whether a woman’s medical condition actually threatens 
her child’s best interests. She reveals how medical 
categorizations of impairments can conceal an ableist 
ideology by shielding certain assumptions from rigorous 
scrutiny. By “ideology”, Mosoff refers to “unquestioned 
ideas and values that guide the way people in a culture 
think and act . . . and pervade what are considered 
                                                 
11  Judith Mosoff, “Motherhood, Madness, and Law” (1995) 45 U 
Toronto LJ 107 at 107.  
12  Ibid at 110–1.  
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obvious ‘natural’ and true explanations”.13 Her reflections 
show a particular sensitivity to how the notion of 
impairment can become a discursive space where an 
ableist ideology can manifest itself and go undetected.  
 
The social model of disability claims that people 
are not disabled because of their biological impairments, 
but by society in its refusal to accommodate their 
impairments. The social model has now found its way 
into the mainstream of legal and political discourses. 
Conceptualizing disability as a socially constructed 
problem has freed a space for activists to claim that they 
are disabled by society rather than by their bodies. This 
has had the significant benefit of positioning the burden 
of accommodation as one that the state must shoulder. 
The social model of disability helpfully framed such 
claims not as support for tragic losses, but as protection 
against oppression, and as a demand that society remove 
the social barriers arbitrarily blocking access to valued 
social roles and opportunities. 14  Social modelists 
presented their view as opposing a traditional “medical 
model” of disability that equates disability with 
impairment. The Union of Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation published the classical formulation of the 
distinction between the concepts of impairment and 
disability at the root of the social model in 1976. It 
                                                 
13  Ibid at 108.  
14  For early theorizations of the social model, see Vic Finkelstein, 
Attitudes and Disabled People (New York: International Exchange of 
Information in Rehabilitation, 1980); Michael Oliver, The Politics of 
Disablement (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990). 
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reflects a medical understanding of “impairment” and a 
social understanding of “disability”:  
Impairment: Lacking part or all of a limb, or 
having a defective limb, organism or 
mechanism of the body; Disability: The 
disadvantage or restriction of activity caused 
by a contemporary social organisation which 
takes no or little account of people who have 
physical impairments and thus excludes 
them from the mainstream of social 
activities.15  
In legal scholarship as well, disability—not 
impairment—became a ground to complain against 
discrimination and claim equal protection and benefit.16 
Impairment is generally taken to be a necessary 
component of disability but is not a concept used to 
discuss how disabled people are oppressed or 
discriminated against. This is clear from the cases in 
which the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed at least two 
elements from the social model of disability: (i) a 
dichotomy between impairment and disability and (ii) the 
use of the latter concept to discuss social barriers and 
                                                 
15  UPIAS, Fundamental Principles of Disability (London: Union of 
Physically Impaired Against Segregation, 1976) at 3–4. 
16  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11, s 15(1) [Charter]; see also various provincial and federal human 
rights laws, such as the Ontario Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H-
19, that enumerate disability as one of the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination.  
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entitlements to their removal.17 Justice Sopinka, writing 
for a majority of the Court in 1997 in Eaton v. Brant 
County Board of Education, stated:  
Exclusion from the mainstream of society 
results from the construction of a society 
based solely on “mainstream” attributes to 
which disabled persons will never be able to 
gain access. Whether it is the impossibility 
of success at a written test for a blind 
person, or the need for ramp access to a 
library, the discrimination does not lie in the 
attribution of untrue characteristics to the 
disabled individual. The blind person cannot 
see and the person in a wheelchair needs a 
ramp. Rather, it is the failure to make 
reasonable accommodation, to fine-tune 
society so that its structures and assumptions 
do not result in the relegation and 
banishment of disabled persons from 
                                                 
17  Note that the Supreme Court of Canada sometimes uses the notion of 
“handicap” to denote what social modelists would call “disability”, 
and sometimes uses the notion of “disability” to denote what social 
modelists would call “impairments”. Those semantic choices do not 
impede our discussion, as long as we keep track of concepts used to 
refer to medical, unalterable facts falling outside the reach of social 
redress and of the law, and concepts used to denote social problems 
that the law can address or are understood by scholars and legal 
actors as denoting, or potentially importing, prejudiced assumptions 
about differently embodied human beings.  
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participation, which results in discrimination 
against them.18 
Justice Sopinka thus places impairments (such as 
blindness and motor impairment) outside of a discussion 
of ableist discrimination. Those are “true” individual 
characteristics, which are not the product of stereotyping 
but are rather natural, value-neutral facts upon which 
discrimination occurs. Social obstacles exclude impaired 
people from mainstream society. Social obstacles turn 
impaired persons into disabled persons. Social failures, 
Justice Sopinka writes, result in discrimination toward 
impaired persons; that is, they cause disability. Judges do 
not examine whether and how the prior identification of 
the individual as “impaired” potentially contributes to a 
person’s disability-qua-oppression.  
 
Justice Binnie, in Granovsky, writing for a 
unanimous Court in 2000, reiterated the same dichotomy 
between impairment and disability, and held that equality 
rights are meant to correct social obstacles imposed on 
impaired people, that is, intentional or unintentional social 
barriers through which the state blocks access to equal 
benefits and protection under the law:  
The Charter is not a magic wand that can 
eliminate physical or mental impairments     
. . . Nor can it alleviate or eliminate the 
functional limitations truly created by the 
impairment. What s.15 of the Charter can 
                                                 
18  [1997] 1 SCR 241 at 272, 142 DLR (4th) 385 [Eaton cited to SCR] 
[emphasis added]. 
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do, and it is a role of immense importance, 
is address the way in which the state 
responds to people with disabilities. Section 
15(1) ensures that governments may not, 
intentionally or through a failure of 
appropriate accommodation, stigmatize the 
underlying physical or mental impairment       
. . . or fail to recognize the added burdens 
which persons with disabilities may 
encounter in achieving self-fulfilment in a 
world relentlessly oriented to the able-
bodied.  
It is therefore useful to keep distinct the 
component of disability that may be said to 
be located in an individual, namely the 
aspects of physical or mental impairment, 
and functional limitation, and on the other 
hand the other component, namely, the 
socially constructed handicap that is not 
located in the individual at all but in the 
society in which the individual is obliged to 
go about his or her everyday tasks.19  
Therefore, the conventional wisdom in disability 
studies and disability law is that impairment is a natural, 
value-neutral—as opposed to socially engineered—
phenomenon, typically detectable and classifiable through 
medical expertise. Disability, on the other hand, is a 
socially constructed, value-laden phenomenon.  
                                                 
19  Granovsky v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 
[2000] 1 SCR 703, 186 DLR (4th) 1 [Granovsky cited to SCR].  
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Like any new paradigm, the social model of 
disability was exposed to a myriad of criticisms. For 
instance, many “impaired/disabled people” feel that their 
subjective experience of impairment, rather than 
oppression, characterizes their disabled identity, or that 
some “impaired/disabled people” do not see themselves 
as oppressed. Other scholars questioned whether the 
impairment/disability dichotomy, like the sex/gender one, 
was sustainable.20 Some of these criticisms partly misfired 
because they attacked social modelists for failing to 
address issues they were not interested in. However, the 
matter becomes more controversial if social modelists are 
not only “uninterested” in dealing with disability-qua-
“subjective experience of impairment” but also suggest 
that discussion of “disabled identity” should be refrained 
from unless it conforms to the framework of the social 
model. If so, social modelists would undermine other 
people’s use of this term to speak of issues, experiences, 
and identity distinct from social oppression.21  
 
In response, new models of disability were 
developed. Current references to a “social model” may 
therefore not necessarily refer to the version popularized 
by Michael Oliver and others22 as these scholars do not 
                                                 
20  For a survey of these criticisms, see Shakespeare & Watson, supra 
note 10. 
21  See Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry, “Beyond (Models of) Disability?” 
(2016) 41 J Medicine & Philosophy 210.  
22  See Oliver, supra note 15; Finkelstein, supra note 15. This has been 
recently reaffirmed, for instance, in Michael Oliver & Colin Barnes, 
The New Politics of Disablement (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012).   
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endorse the claim that disability is solely caused by social 
vectors. Instead, many endorse versions of a social model 
that might be more aptly called “mixed” or 
“multidimensional” models insofar as they retain the 
insight that disability is caused by social factors, but reject 
the view that disability is exclusively caused by such 
factors.23  
  
Theorists who endorse mixed or interactional 
models of disability typically allow for some social 
constructivism in the constitution of disability but adhere 
to (some version of) an ontologically realist position when 
it comes to impairments. Even Tom Shakespeare, who is 
very attuned to the complex processes through which a 
disabled identity is formed, endorses a “critical realist” 
perspective on impairment. He writes: “while different 
cultures have different views or beliefs or attitudes to 
disability, impairment has always existed and has its own 
experiential reality.”24  
 
The controversial compromise between medical, 
social, experiential and other models of disability is the 
view retained by the World Health Organization (which 
adopted a “bio-psycho-social” model25) and possibly by 
the Supreme Court of Canada. On the one hand, as the 
extracts above suggest, the Court seems to recognize that 
                                                 
23  See e.g. Jerome Bickenbach, Ethics, Law, and Policy (New York: 
Sage Publishing, 2012) at 14–15.  
24  Tom Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs (New York: 
Routledge, 2006) at 54. 
25  World Health Organization (WHO), International Classification of 
Functioning, Disability and Health (Geneva: WHO, 2001).  
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disabilities have varying causes, which would take it 
closer to a mixed model of disability. On the other, the 
Court says that it cannot do anything regarding the 
biological or medical causes and that discrimination law 
is only about particular social causes of disability, a 
position closer to that of traditional social modelists. 
Whichever position the Court may come to endorse on the 
issue of causality, my comment is the same: whether the 
Court sees impairment as a sine qua non condition, but 
not a cause, of disability-qua-oppression, or as one of the 
causes of disability-qua-mixed-phenomenon, it does not 
consider impairments to be socially constructed or 
created. Impairments are “true characteristics”26 that are 
believed to lie outside the reach of ideology, stigma, 
oppression, or disciplinary apparatuses.  
 
THINKING ABOUT THE SUBJECT AND POWER 
DIFFERENTLY 
 
A natural reflex of a social justice scholar, upon hearing 
that “impairments” may themselves incorporate 
unquestioned prejudices, would be to expand an enquiry 
into stigmatizing attitudes toward impairments. This 
strategy, while measurably helpful in some ways, would 
confirm, rather than challenge, the assumption that there 
is an entity at which prejudicial attitudes are directed and 
that this entity itself is a “natural fact”. Such a scholar 
may also be keen to combat stigma by accepting the 
notion that impairments are constructs and looking for 
another natural fact (e.g., “differently embodied persons”) 
that may be discriminated against. She may hold that 
                                                 
26  Eaton, supra note 19 at 272. 
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doctors and lawyers would turn those natural facts about 
people into inherently stigmatized impairments, just as 
ableist employers and discriminatory state policies would 
turn impairments into disabilities. The well-meaning 
quest for justice within the confines of liberal legal 
scholarship would take the form of a pursuit of the subject 
unencumbered by stigma in order to free her.  
 
Alternative philosophical traditions, however, 
would resist the temptation to look for a subject whose 
status is not tainted by ideology, that is, a subject whose 
needs and preferences could be authentically understood 
in abstraction from the “vagaries of circumstance”27: the 
subject lying behind the “differently embodied subject”, 
itself lying behind the “impaired subject”, itself lying 
behind the “disabled subject”. Social justice scholars are 
committed to attempting this perpetual regression because 
of their liberal understanding of the subject as preceding 
power. Liberal theory traditionally justifies the state’s 
authority to exercise power by seating it on the will of 
subjects who are postulated to exist beyond the reach of 
power that they themselves exercise and transfer to the 
state. An alternative theory of the subject, found in the 
work of Michel Foucault, denies that subjects precede 
power. This alternative view considers how power may be 
exercised through practices such as undergoing medical or 
judicial scrutiny and how subjects actively participate in 
the production of knowledge about themselves in a way 
that would legitimize their various treatments, from 
institutionalization to financial support.  
                                                 
27  Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed 
(Cambridge University Press, 1982) at 19. 
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The suggestion that the agency of subjects is 
orchestrated by forces that ought to be scrutinized is 
potentially problematic for liberalism, as it undermines 
the liberal conception of freedom and the strategies 
undertaken to achieve it. In addition to their 
understanding of the subject, a connected reason why 
legal scholars working within a mainstream liberal 
framework fail to see the usefulness of a Foucauldian 
approach is because of their understanding of power. 
Here, I define power broadly as “compliance-securing 
mechanisms” 28  to capture both the kind of centralized 
power exercised by the state that liberals are traditionally 
preoccupied with and the kind of “micro-powers that are 
exercised at the level of daily life”29 that Foucault and his 
followers investigate. Instead of reducing power to 
something done to an unencumbered subject, these 
theorists understand the subject as constituted by a 
reiterative process of practices, performances and 
discourses in which both the subject and others take part. 
Instead of understanding power as exercised by a 
dominant group over a subjugated one, this approach 
understands power as exercised through the subject’s 
identity and agency. As Foucault writes: 
[P]ower reaches into the very grain of 
individuals, touches their bodies and inserts 
itself into their actions and attitudes, their 
                                                 
28  Stevens Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed (New York: Palgrave 
McMillan, 2005) at 88. 
29  Michel Foucault, "Body/Power" in Colin Gordon, ed, 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–
1977 (New York: Pantheon Books,1980) at 59.  
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discourses, learning processes and everyday 
lives. The eighteenth century invented [a 
regime of power exercised] within the social 
body, rather than from above it.30 
Such non-directly coercive, but regulative 
mechanisms include the medico-legal determination that 
Shirley would be allowed to visit her child under 
supervision in order to determine whether she was a fit 
guardian. Mosoff describes her client being “heavily 
medicated and very sad”:  
[Shirley’s] supervised access visits to her 
baby . . . were observed by those who would 
eventually be called to give evidence about 
her capacity as a mother. Her visits with the 
baby took place through the haze of 
medication which blurred her vision, made 
her mouth dry, and rendered her movements 
stiff. She was told to be spontaneous and 
demonstrative with the child.31 
 This disheartening description arouses a sense of 
injustice, because the expectations of being spontaneous 
and demonstrative seem questionable, especially given 
Shirley’s medicated state:  
                                                 
30  Michel Foucault, "Prison Talk" in Colin Gordon, ed, 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–
1977 (New York: Pantheon Books,1980) at 39.  
31  Mosoff, supra note 12 at 107. 
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Eventually [Shirley] agreed that she needed 
to remove herself from her child in the best 
interests of the child. The case ended with a 
consent order giving permanent custody to 
the superintendent so that the child could be 
adopted. . . . Mothers with mental health 
histories may themselves be convinced that 
it is best to give up their child without a 
hearing.32 
Of interest is that the case was solved through 
Shirley’s own agency. Through engaging with medical, 
welfare or legal frameworks, “differently embodied 
people” 33  (hereinafter DEP) come to see themselves 
                                                 
32  Ibid at 107, 128.  
33 I will sometimes use the term “differently embodied people” (or the 
acronym DEP) to keep a lexical distance from the terms “disabled 
persons” and “impaired persons”. By “differently embodied people”, 
I refer to people with unusual experiences or needs related to their 
particular embodiment, and I mean to encompass any physical and 
neurological differences without committing either to a particular 
source of authority to define those differences (as the medical model 
does when it relies on medical experts to identify “impaired 
individuals”), to particular experiences (such as someone’s subjective 
appreciation of one’s own situation), or to particular stigmas 
compounding one’s situation (as the social model does by claiming 
that social factors cause “disability”). The term “differently embodied 
people” is not itself immune to criticism (notably, the term “different” 
prompts the question: different from what?). I am not necessarily 
claiming that this is a term that has any more truth about the broad 
umbrella of disability-related concepts or that it identifies a core 
shared by all of those concepts. I only suggest that it is helpful to 
discuss the specific notions I deal with in this paper to gain 
conceptual distance from “impairment” and “disability” when and if 
needed. 
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differently. Regulated “impairment talk” is one of the 
mechanisms through which DEP come to endorse “what 
others see as [their] failing, inevitably causing [them], if 
only for moments, to agree that [they do] indeed fall short 
of what [they] really ought to be.”34  
 
If the “disabled subject” or the “impaired subject” 
never escapes power relations but is rather constituted by 
them, a mode of resistance for scholars and advocates for 
people in Shirley’s situation might be to question the 
expectations imposed on mentally ill women performing 
the role of mothers.35 A critical analysis of the mothering 
practices of women with mental health diagnoses—
including an analysis of paternalistic supervision by 
medical and legal bodies—would render visible a pre-
legal normative framework of “proper mothering” more 
or less taken for granted by legal actors enforcing it. Of 
interest to Foucauldian scholars would be the practices of 
inviting women to submit themselves to medical and 
judicial forms of scrutiny that require them to meet a set 
of unquestioned standards. Such processes, which are 
inscribed within invisible power relationships, inherently 
limit the conceptual horizon of recourses available to 
DEP.  
 
 Shirley’s story demonstrates a form of knowledge 
production and shows us how “knowledge-based power” 
(by contrast to repressive power) operates. We ‘learn’ that 
                                                 
34  Goffman, supra note 2 at 7.  
35  Jane C Murphy, “Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting 
Definitions from Welfare Reform Family and Criminal Law” (1998) 
83 Cornell L Rev 688.  
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Shirley is unfit to be a mother, indeed through her own 
statement. It was her ‘confession’, but also the 
unquestioned process, tied up with power relations, that 
constituted her into an impaired subject with limited legal 
options. We may call this kind of knowledge 
“confessional knowledge”.36 This notion emphasizes that 
“disabled people” are invited or pressured to identify 
themselves within legal (and other social) frameworks 
that not only serve their explicit purposes but also mold 
the social roles, self-understanding, relations with others, 
and agency of DEP.  
 
In the case of Shirley, the supervised visits with 
her child, displaying her parental capacities, constituted 
the setting of her “confession”. Another illustration of the 
production of confessional knowledge in legal settings is 
when judges interrogate potential witnesses with 
cognitive impairments to test whether they can act as 
witnesses. Cognitive impairments are traditionally taken 
to be an objective basis to justify some people’s exclusion 
from the witness stand, while the notion of a “normal 
witness” goes largely unquestioned.37  Since testimonies 
arguably construct reality, what follows is an erasure of 
harms endured by cognitively different individuals and a 
                                                 
36  I refer to the Foucauldian idea that subjects produce knowledge about 
themselves—and transform themselves in the process—in a 
confessional manner. Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol.1, 
translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) at 
58–62. 
37  Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry, “The Intellectually Disabled Witness and 
the Requirement to Promise to Tell the Truth” (2017) 40:1 Dal LJ 1.  
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reinforcement of their social exclusion.38 Confession can 
also take the form of filling extensive Disability Living 
Allowance forms about one’s “toilet needs”. Subjects 
accept undergoing such a production of knowledge about 
themselves because it can give them access to certain 
benefits, such as being allowed to parent one’s child, 
testify in a case against one’s aggressor, or access social 
support.39  
 
The act of “confessing” transforms the confessor; 
in legal contexts, it changes her status, sometimes for the 
worse. Whereas Mosoff exposed paternalistic practices 
through which women are asked to show that they can 
reach the status of mothers fit to parent, Shildrick and 
Price focus on the “self-generated and self-policed 
behaviours” that welfare claimants engage in to satisfy 
“disciplinary economies” that require “goods and desires” 
to conform to what is considered normal:  
No area of bodily functioning escapes the 
requirement of total visibility. . . . The 
welfare claimant is controlled not by a 
                                                 
38  For instance, by asking a proposed witness with cognitive impairment 
whether she’s been “told about God”, whether she’ll go to jail if she 
tells “big lies”, or whether she’s heard the expression “I promise to be 
good, mommy”, a judge would not only be examining testimonial 
reliability, but also naturalizing a specific conception of a “normal 
witness”. (Those questions, though deemed to be inappropriate by the 
Supreme Court, were asked at trial to a proposed witness with a 
mental disability, as reported in R v DAI, 2012 SCC 5 at para 84, 
[2012] 1 SCR 149.) 
39  Margrit Shildrick & Janet Price, “Breaking the Boundaries of the 
Broken Body” (1996) 2 Body & Society 93.  
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display of external coercion but by 
continuous surveillance. . . . [Through] the 
Disability Living Allowance claim form, she 
produces herself as a disabled subject.40  
This degree of invasiveness and control over 
individuals’ private lives seems to belong to a dystopian 
novel, and yet it is commonly tolerated because 
knowledge-based power goes unnoticed: its 
manifestations are assumed to be objectively necessary 
ways of dealing with the essentialised abnormality of 
certain individuals. While seeming to attend to the 
individuality of a disabled person’s needs, the welfare 
forms considered by Shildrick and Price universalize the 
unique individual claimant and turn her into a manageable 
“impaired subject”. Power is therefore partly exercised 
through the self-enforcement of norms by the subject 
herself. Legal texts and policies not only coerce the 
subject but guide her self-understanding and self-
regulation.  
 
Even in coercive settings, the law’s invitation to 
perform rituals that will allow individuals to qualify as 
victims, claimants, witnesses, etc. do not fit a traditional 
understanding of coercion. The requirement to meet those 
                                                 
40  Ibid at 103–4. Mosoff, supra note 12 at 109–10, similarly reports that 
“[b]ecause mothers with mental health histories are often portrayed as 
dangerous or potentially dangerous to their vulnerable children . . . 
women can expect the smallest and most intimate details of their lives 
to be considered legitimate subject matter of the public domain . . . 
[b]ecause of a medical/scientific assertion about a person that creates 
and names her difference, such women have little claim to any 
vestige of privacy.” 
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status-granting criteria are presented as natural 
necessities. Knowledge-based power is exercised at this 
early stage of qualifying to participate in the legal sphere 
as a full legal subject. Even if it becomes possible for 
DEP to challenge repressive power on specifically 
recognized grounds within the legal sphere, it will often 
be after having submitted their unusual bodies (and 
connected needs and capacities) to the invasive scrutiny 
of medical and legal actors who act as gatekeepers to 
crucial resources and opportunities. 
 
The most compelling reason for liberal scholars to 
endorse a critical posture toward their own endeavours is 
that a repressive view of power captures only the rarest 
and most visible uses of power. In an article criticizing 
the unnecessarily normalizing impetus of medical 
interventions, Anita Silvers report that many adults born 
with a limb malformation regret “having had their natural 
digits amputated, being fitted with ineffective artificial 
arms, and forbidden to use the much more functional 
method of manipulating objects with their feet”.41  It is 
hard to imagine a more invasive use of power than one 
driving parents to consent to their children’s amputation 
so that they would look a little more “normal”. Yet, this 
kind of power is typically invisible. Impairments were 
used in the instance described by Silvers as a ground for 
exercising power for the benefit of those children. Liberal 
narratives of power operate on such beneficial, welfare-
                                                 
41  Anita Silvers, “On the Possibility and Desirability of Constructing a 
Neutral Conception of Disability” (2003) 24 Theor Med Bioeth 471 
at 475.  
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maximizing grounds42 (e.g., it is for the best interests of 
children to be removed from their mother’s custody or, 
given a certain set of congenital conditions, never to have 
been born). Even well-meaning medical practices and 
legal discourses related to disability can perpetuate the 
subjugation of the “impaired subject”. As Judith Butler 
puts it, “we may seek recourse to matter [in our case: 
impairment] in order to ground or verify a set of injuries 
or violations only to find that matter [impairment] itself is 
founded through a set of violations.”43 
 
To explore what a critical ontology of impairment 
may look like within disability legal scholarship, the rest 
of this article examines the theoretical foundations of such 
a practice, potential political-legal manifestations of it, 
and objections to both the foundations and practice of a 
critical ontology of impairment.  
 
2. TOWARD A CRITICAL ONTOLOGY OF 
IMPAIRMENT IN DISABILITY LAW 
 
CONSTITUTING AND MAINTAINING AN 
IMPAIRED IDENTITY  
 
Differently embodied people are often attributed statuses 
(medical ones like “diseased”, “impaired”, “disabled”, or 
degrading ones found in popular culture like “freak”) that 
confine and orientate the exercise of their freedom. For 
instance, some report that “women who have disabilities 
                                                 
42  Michel Foucault, Naissance de la Biopolitique. Cours au Collège de 
France, 1978–1979 (France: Seuil/Gallimard, 2004). 
43  Butler, supra note 4 at 29. 
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are seen as being sexless, unattractive, unmarriageable 
and generally non-female”.44 Through social activism, the 
status of a “person with disabilities” has been cast under a 
more positive light, but it remains commonly associated 
with the role of the sick.45 As a result, many differently 
embodied people reject the status of a “disabled 
person”.46 This is pragmatically doable if they do not need 
to endorse this status in order to be processed within 
welfare, anti-discrimination, workplace integration, or 
punitive legal frameworks.  
 
The acquisition and parameters of the status of an 
“impaired person” are harder to challenge. 47  Social 
modelists have negotiated a space for a disabled identity 
to be worn as a political badge promoting anger rather 
than sadness, hope rather than despair, strength rather 
than docility. The same cannot be said of an impaired 
identity, which social modelists have been accused of 
                                                 
44  Sharon Barnartt, “Using Role Theory to Describe Disability” (2001) 
2 Res in Social Science and Disability 53 at 61, referring to Michelle 
Fine & Adrienne Asch, “Disability Beyond Stigma: Social 
Interaction, Discrimination, and Activism” (1988) 44:1 Journal of 
Social Issues 3.  
45  Saad Z Nagi, “Some Conceptual Issues in Disability and 
Rehabilitation” in MB Sussman, ed, Sociology and Rehabilitation 
(Washington: American Sociological Association, 1970) at 104.  
46  Nick Watson, “Well, I Know this is Going to Sound Very Strange to 
You, but I Don't See Myself as a Disabled Person: Identity and 
Disability” (2002) 17:5 Disability & Society 509 at 522.  
47  This is for reasons similar to those given by Saad Nagi for 
distinguishing the role of a “sick or ill person in a hospital or clinic” 
as that of a patient and the role of a “disabled person in a 
rehabilitation setting” as that of a client. Nagi, supra note 45 at 106. 
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having surrendered to medical experts, leaving it to them 
to define “impairments” and prescribe expectations 
attached to it.48 A medical, value-neutral understanding of 
impairment is theoretically possible,49  but some find it 
“politically naïve”50 while others suggest that it flies in 
the face of the history of the use of statistical sciences by 
the state to manage public health, 51  as well as of the 
emergence of the figure of the “chronic patient”.52 One 
could also object to a value-neutral conception of 
impairment because empirical data indicates that 
impairments are, in practice, negatively valued by both 
able-bodied and disabled people.53  
 
                                                 
48  See Hughes & Paterson, supra note 1; Tremain, supra note 11. 
Although these criticisms may have a de facto purchase, I note that 
social modelists like Michael Oliver endorse a “structural account” of 
impairment that challenges the “personal tragedy theory [that] 
impairments are chance events happening to unfortunate individuals”. 
Oliver holds that “impairments are not randomly distributed 
throughout the world but are culturally produced.” Oliver, supra note 
15 at 12, 14.  
49  Consider Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu, “The Welfarist Account of 
Disability” in Kimberley Brownlee & Adam Cureton, eds, Disability 
and Disadvantage (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
50  Tremain, supra note 11 at 621.  
51  Lennard Davis, “Constructing Normalcy” in Lennard Davis, ed, The 
Disability Studies Reader, 2nd ed (New York: Routledge, 2006) 3.  
52  William Arney & Bernard Bergen, “The Anomaly, the Chronic 
Patient and the Play of Medical Power” (1983) 5:1 Sociology of 
Health & Illness 1.  
53  Watson, supra note 46.  
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Such a negatively charged understanding of 
impairment may come to be incorporated into one’s 
identity through different practices and discourses: 
unpleasant routines, failure to socialize, lack of 
spontaneity connected to an obligation to plan ahead, and 
formally asking for support.54 Through the performance 
of such practices, the differently embodied person 
becomes an “impaired subject”, sometimes described in 
ways reminiscent of the biomedical model that constructs 
disability as medical condition and a personal tragedy.55 
Eve, a self-described “sad lonely character” with multiple 
sclerosis reports:  
Well, you are so much trouble to people. . . .  
I just feel that before everything happened 
things were good and boyfriends were on 
the scene and marriage was on the scene and 
everything changed with MS.56  
The goal of genealogizing impairment would be to 
understand how culture, ideology or power transformed 
Eve into an impaired person and orchestrated her self-
understanding. Surely, Eve cannot theorize her medical 
condition away. To carry out a critical ontology of 
impairment requires us to qualify what is meant by 
“social construction” to avoid the criticism that “the 
constructivist refutes the reality of bodies, the relevance 
of science, the alleged facts of birth, aging, illness, and 
                                                 
54  Ibid at 522. 
55  Ibid at 522–23. 
56  Ibid at 523.  
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death.” 57  One need not suggest that reality is only a 
function of language to argue that impairments are 
socially constructed. One may concede that a natural 
substrate of some kind underlies “impairment” and still 
hold that any effort to define and describe it cannot avoid 
contributing to, rather than strictly describing, this 
phenomenon. We may think of social construction as a 
kind of co-creative or interpretative exercise rather than a 
creation ex nihilo.58  
 
Mainstream disability studies and legal 
scholarship have effectively “concede[d] the body to 
medicine”59 and limited the scope of their constructivist 
critique. To challenge how impaired identities are 
formulated and used within legal frameworks, we need to 
begin articulating impairment and disability differently.  
 
EMANCIPATORY STRATEGIES  
 
A critical ontology of impairment can serve to support at 
least two emancipatory strategies: (1) the strategy of 
challenging power by denying, resisting, and redefining 
the impaired status imposed on DEP and (2) the strategy 
of articulating disability claims independently from the 
concept of impairment.  
 
 
                                                 
57  Butler, supra note 4 at 10, 28.  
58  Ibid at 10.  
59  Hughes & Paterson, supra note 1 at 326. 
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(i) Challenging Cultural Appreciations of One’s Bodily 
Differences  
 
As Shakespeare and Watson argue, impairments are 
“experientially salient” to many disabled people. 60 
Hughes suggests that people with visible disabilities may 
be more prone to “experience their bodies as an influential 
presence [in the context of everyday social encounters]”. 
Whereas the body is “normally taken for granted by most 
people in most situations”, visible disabilities draw 
attention to the power of the body.61 Some, like Jenny 
Morris, would therefore prioritize the development of a 
“disability culture [that] give[s] [people with different 
embodiments] the confidence to take pride in our 
difference, to assert that we have an experience which is 
valid and important”.62 Otherwise, social modelists may 
be recruiting demoralized soldiers who can hardly attach 
an activist badge on their bruised identity, which has 
already incorporated the expectations associated with an 
“impaired person”. If endorsing the social model’s 
political badge of “disabled” requires one to give in to the 
medical understanding of impairments, many DEP may 
choose to avoid this identity.  
 
Those difficulties have led “second wave” 
disability theorists to be skeptical of identity politics 
                                                 
60  Shakespeare & Watson, supra note 10 at 15.  
61  Bill Hughes, “Disability and the Body”, in Colin Barnes et al, eds, 
Disability Studies Today (Cambridge: Polity 2002) at 71. 
62  Jenny Morris, Pride Against Prejudice (British Columbia: New 
Society Publishers, 1993) at 114.  
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within the disability movement. While some would detach 
emancipatory discourses from any kind of self-
identification as an impaired person (see next section), 
others prefer to redeem the notion of impairment, 
precisely because embodiment—and the experience of 
one’s embodiment in a world of differently embodied 
people—is salient to the life and identity of many 
disabled people. The disability movement may follow 
Morris’s advice to develop a more positive “impaired 
status”. Morris gives the example of deaf people who 
“because they have a separate language . . . often have a 
clearer sense of a separate culture and history than do 
other groups of disabled people.” 63  Such cultural 
reframing of embodied experiences of difference in a 
more positive or empowering way, sustaining a 
recognition of identity rather than the material 
redistribution primarily sought by social modelists, may 
do more for people like Shirley and Eve than the social 
model could.64  
 
A large body of reflections authored by disabled 
people could contribute to this cultural shift. The key 
virtue of this strategy is that it helps disabled people 
regain control of the construction of an impaired identity. 
Scholars like Carol Thomas and Bryan Turner express 
concerns over such narratives becoming too idiosyncratic 
and being “largely devoid of historical and sociological 
                                                 
63  Ibid at 113.  
64  For a discussion of the benefits of both distributive and recognitive 
measures, see Nancy Fraser & Axel Honneth, Redistribution or 
Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London: Verso, 
2003).  
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content”. 65  However, they are not intended to replace 
political movements, but only help those movements stay 
connected to the actual concerns of their constituencies. 
Moreover, underestimating the value of personal 
narratives within social struggles risks failing to see the 
political in the personal and vice-versa.66  
 
However, social modelists like Colin Barnes and 
Michael Oliver have expressed concerns that a focus on 
impairment (or difference, or different embodiment) “will 
only de-politicise the social model” without yielding any 
alternative models that may be operational within 
“campaigns to improve or defend the lifestyles of disabled 
people”.67 Criticisms in this vein resemble arguments in 
favour of identity politics. Responses may therefore take 
the form of traditional attacks on identarian politics, such 
as the fact that group identities put forward in 
emancipatory struggles may not be adequately 
representative or may be assimilationist.68  
                                                 
65  Bryan Turner, The Body and Society, 3rd ed (New York: Sage 
Publishing, 2008) at 52. See also Carol Thomas, “Disability Theory: 
Key Ideas, Issues and Thinkers” in Colin Barnes et al, eds, Disability 
Studies Today (Cambridge: Polity, 2002) 38 at 44.  
66  Thomas, supra note 65 at 50. 
67  Mike Oliver, “The Social Model of Disability: Thirty Years On” 
(2013) 28:7 Disability & Society 1024 at 1025; Colin Barnes, 
“Disability Studies and the Academy—Past, Present and Future” 
(2013) 4 Ars Vivendi 3.  
68  Cressida Heyes "Identity Politics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, (2016), online: <plato.stanford.edu>; Kimberley 
Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics 
and Violence against Women of Color” (1991) 43:6 Stan L Rev 1241.  
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(ii) Detaching Disability-Related Claims from 
Impairments  
 
A political alternative is to detach impairments from 
disability claims altogether. This approach would 
radically sever any connection with the medical model of 
disability (which holds that disability and impairment are 
co-extensive). It would also depart from the mainstream 
“Russian nesting doll” model of disability generally 
endorsed by the social model and a variety of authorities 
that keep impairments at the heart of the concept of 
disability by making it a necessary condition for disability 
to exist, even though it severs the causal relation between 
impairment and the ideological and power-related 
dimensions of said disability. Rather than “secur[ing] the 
political freedom of a particular [impaired] constituency”, 
the disability movement would need to organize its 
political platform around “belief systems, programmatic 
manifestos, or party affiliation”.69 What would it mean to 
articulate disability claims without relying on the notion 
of impairments? This question asks whether the disability 
movement—historically defined around a group 
identity—can coherently abandon identitarian politics for 
a more profitable alternative. It asks what other values 
and manifestos could be endorsed by social actors 
preoccupied with the fate of DEP.  
 
Articulating disability claims beyond a shared 
identity may be less sacrilegious than it seems to social 
modelists. The heterogeneity of the group of “disabled 
people” is such that there is no unifying membership 
                                                 
69  Heyes, supra note 68. 
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criterion to the “disability community” other than 
impairment. Thus, empirical research like that of Watson 
suggests that much disability activism “rests on an 
unreflexive acceptance of the distinction of disabled/non-
disabled”.70  
 
The Mercier case at the Supreme Court of 
Canada71 provides us with a platform to begin discussing 
what a post-identity approach of disability might look like 
in legal terms. Three individuals complained to the 
Quebec Human Rights Commission for having been 
discriminated against on the basis of their disability.72 Ms. 
Mercier and Mr. Jean-Marc Hamon had spinal cord 
anomalies and were not hired by municipal bodies to 
work. Another municipality refused to hire Mr. Palmerino 
Troilo, the third appellant in Mercier, because he had 
Crohn's disease. This case raised the question of whether 
the complainants were “disabled” in a legal sense, 
considering that they were all asymptomatic.  
 
The American Supreme Court had held that the 
status of being impaired, in and of itself, did not suffice to 
bring someone under the purview of the American with 
                                                 
70  Watson, supra note 46 at 525.  
71  Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la 
jeunesse) v Montréal (City); Quebec (Commission des droits de la 
personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Boisbriand (City), 2000 SCC 
27, [2000] 1 SCR 665 [Mercier].  
72  The Court says “handicap”, but conceptually refers to what 
mainstream disability studies would identify as “disability”, see supra 
note 18 on terminology.  
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Disabilities Act (ADA). 73  Impairments are, under the 
ADA, necessary but insufficient conditions to constitute 
disability; they have to cause substantial limits on major 
life activities. 74  The trial judge who dealt with Ms. 
Mercier’s and Mr. Troilo’s cases followed the American 
Supreme Court’s logic. The three complainants had 
impairments in that they had a physiological dysfunction. 
However, being asymptomatic, their impairments did not 
amount to a functional limitation. Therefore, Judge 
Brossard concluded that Ms. Mercier and Mr. Troilo's 
“physical anomalies” did not amount to them having 
“handicaps for the purposes of s. 10 of [Quebec's Charter 
of Human Rights and Freedoms] because they do not 
suffer from a disadvantage or disability that results in a 
functional limitation.”75  
 
The significance of an “impaired” or “disabled” 
identity is highlighted in cases where failing to properly 
identify oneself effectively deprives claimants of legal 
standing or legal positions. As an illustration of the irony, 
an employer tells a person with a “physical anomaly”: “I 
won’t hire you because you’re disabled.” The prospective 
                                                 
73  Sutton v United Airlines, Inc, 1999 199 S Ct 2133; Murphy v United 
Parcel Services, 1999 119 S Ct 2133; rejected by the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, including changes made by the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub L No 110–325, tit 42 § 12101 note 
(a)(4) and (b)(2).  
74  Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub L No 101–336, § 
12102, 108th Congress, 2nd sess (26 July 1990), including changes 
made by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub L No 110–325.  
75  Mercier, supra note 71 at para 14 referring to Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms, RSQ, c C-12. 
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employee answers: “No, I’m not. I’m perfectly able to do 
the work”.  The employer concludes: “Good! It means 
that you won’t be able to sue me.” It is to prevent such 
unfair outcomes that Justice Rivet, presiding over the 
Hamon case at the trial level, found that actionable 
discrimination could be based on limitations, even 
“limitations attributed in error”. In doing so, she grounded 
a disability claim on stigma or prejudiced assumptions 
alone.76  
 
The Court of Appeal reversed the decision and 
held that the applicants had been victims of 
discriminatory exclusion because being impaired was 
enough to classify someone as handicapped.77 The Court 
of Appeal equated disability with impairment (i.e., it 
endorsed the medical model), which provided relief for 
Troilo and Mercier, who had actual physiological 
anomalies, but would have failed to help people 
stigmatized on the basis of falsely attributed 
characteristics.  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada, recognizing that 
the “nature of discrimination is often subjective” and 
“may be based as much on perception and myths and 
stereotypes as on the existence of actual functional 
                                                 
76   Ibid at paras 15–17. 
77  Ibid at paras 18–24: “[The C.A. Judge] referred to case law and 
literature, but declined to adopt a strict [or exhaustive] definition of 
the concept of handicap. . . . [He only stated that] a handicap may 
take the form of a loss, malformation or abnormality of an organ, a 
structure or an anatomical, physiological, psychological or mental 
function.”  
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limitations,” 78  followed Justice Rivet, rather than the 
Court of Appeal, in detaching disability from impairment.  
 
The Supreme Court did not, however, endorse a 
general stigma-based conception of disability that would 
altogether detach disability from the idea of the body. 
Prejudices are still “body-related” even if they are 
grounded in imaginings. Otherwise, it would be hard to 
distinguish disability from any other ground of 
discrimination.79 In fact, other grounds like age or sex are 
also closely related to human embodiment, so we need to 
further narrow the kind of stigma associated with 
disability by connecting it to “abnormal” bodies. Having a 
female or an aged anatomy attract stigma, but if a young 
man would look like an older woman, then the stigma 
associated with his attributes would be related to 
disability, as understood here, because prejudices would 
not be directed at his female or aged bodily features, but 
at the fact that those bodily features differ from a young 
man’s “normal” body. 
 
Although Justice L’Heureux-Dubé claims to be 
incorporating the social model into Canadian law, 80  it 
                                                 
78  Mercier, supra note 71 at para 39; see also para 81.  
79  Consider e.g. Tom Koch, “Is Tom Shakespeare Disabled?” (2008) 34 
J Med Ethics 18, who would implicitly define disability merely as a 
loss of social opportunities or power, or as exclusion from certain 
roles or relations.  
80  She writes that handicaps are “personal characteristics or ailments” 
that attract a “negative bias” (Mercier, supra note 71 at para 83) and 
this “negative bias” generates “obstacles to full participation in 
society” (ibid), or “the loss or limitation of opportunities to take part 
in the life of the community on an equal level with others” (ibid at 
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seems that the Court offered a distinct “discrimination 
model” of disability in Mercier. 81  Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé does not require a cumulation of factors typical of 
multidimensional models of disability. One need not be 
disabled by one’s body and by society. Her definition is 
more open-ended: “a “handicap” (i.e., disability) may be 
the result of a physical limitation, an ailment, a social 
construct, a perceived limitation or a combination of these 
factors.”82 She refuses to provide a narrow definition of 
disability, because “what is a handicap today may or may 
not be one tomorrow”.83 Her “discrimination model” of 
disability could be interpreted as merely requiring 
physical or mental features that attract stigma. If her 
open-ended definition of disability is read as detaching 
the concept of disability from the notion of physiological 
anomaly, other traits attracting this stigma—like 
unconventional looks, unattractive appearances, or 
obesity—would fall under this definition. On the other 
hand, she says that having a cold or having blue eyes 
would not count as disabilities because they do not attract 
negative biases.84  
                                                                                               
para 80). She also explicitly incorporates into her judgment Jerome 
Bickenbach’s terminology of a “social phenomenon of handicapping” 
(ibid at para 83), as well as his focus on the socio-political 
dimensions of disability (ibid at para 77).  
81  Especially considering that establishing handicap as ground of 
discrimination does not require proof of physical limitations or the 
presence of an actual physiological anomaly. 
82  Mercier, supra note 71 at para 79 [emphasis added]. 
83  Ibid at para 76. 
84  Ibid at para 82. 
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This discrimination model of disability comes as 
close as an actual judicial model can to David 
Wasserman’s plea for a de-medicalized interpretation of 
disability discrimination under the ADA. 85  Wasserman 
argues that protection against disability discrimination 
should extend to any “disfavored physical and mental 
variations.”86 If the goal of human rights legislation is to 
protect “some of the least advantaged and most 
stigmatized members of society”, it would be counter-
productive to ignore how “disabling habits of thoughts 
and social practices” 87  function. Waserman’s stigma-
based approach to disability (or Mercier’s discrimination 
model of disability) would turn our attention to how and 
why stigma functions and invite analyses of a history of 
negative affective responses toward “abnormal bodies”.88 
This more open-ended approach better captures arbitrary 
prejudices against different forms of embodiment not 
clearly associated with historically oppressed groups or 
defined within the narrow confines of “medical anomaly”. 
Extending the protection of human rights law would 
protect and respect a wide range of people who do not fall 
within the traditional conception of “disabled people” but 
still struggle with “body prejudice”.  
 
                                                 
85  David Wasserman, “Stigma Without Impairment” in Leslie Francis & 
Anita Silvers, eds, Americans with Disabilities (New York: 
Routledge, 2000) 146. 
86  Ibid at 148. 
87  Ibid at 159.  
88  See Shildrick, supra note 11. 
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One the other hand, this approach would deprive 
courts of clear, easily supported criteria to establish 
disability discrimination. Canadian Courts have long tried 
to overcome the difficulty of proving discriminatory 
attitudes by relying on “facts” such as impairments and 
different treatments 89  to establish discrimination by 
effects rather than by intent.  
 
Some legal literature suggests avenues to 
articulate equality claims on the basis of fundamental 
interests90 and vulnerability,91 and the same could be done 
around stigma 92  and disability/impairment. These 
concepts can be taken to be conditions which might apply 
to everyone rather than as descriptors of an “insular and 
discrete” identity. For instance, according to Goffman, the 
notion of stigma refers to any discrediting feature and 
only acquires a stigmatizing dimension within specific 
contexts.93  With regard to disability specifically, Irving 
Zola has popularized the view that disability is a universal 
                                                 
89  Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 
DLR (4th) 1; See also Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5, 
[2013] 1 SCR 61 in which the Court distanced itself from too thick an 
attitudinal analysis of discrimination.  
90   Robin Elliot & Michael Elliot, “The Addition of an Interest-Based 
Route into Section 15 of the Charter” (2014) 64 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 
461.  
91  Martha Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the 
Human Condition” (2008) 20:1 Yale JL & Feminism 1. 
92  Wasserman’s chapter, supra note 85, is a contribution to this 
enterprise.  
93  Goffman, supra note 2 at 2–5.  
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condition, so that social and legal measures should deal 
with disability and impairment accordingly:  
 
[A]n exclusively special needs approach to 
disability is inevitably a short-run approach. 
What we need are more universal policies 
that recognize that the entire population is 
“at risk” for the concomitants of chronic 
illness and disability.94  
 
The parameters of a principled approach to weigh 
the merits of disability claims on grounds other than 
impairments remain embryonic and this is perhaps the 
challenge that disability law scholarship must confront 
head on. Zola’s universalist model, often echoed in 
disability studies, lays the theoretical grounds to 
legitimize “universal design" claims in a way that would 
not require claimants to constitute themselves into 
impaired subjects of power.  
 
Shelley Tremain and Wendy Brown recommend 
that “protest[s] against marginalization or subordination” 
take the political form of demanding “what we want” 
rather than of stating “who we are”, since making claims 
on the basis of “impairments” will necessarily “appeal to 
the very identity upon which [the] subjection [of DEP] 
                                                 
94  Irving Zola, “Toward the Necessary Universalizing of a Disability 
Policy” (1989) 67:2 The Milbank Quarterly 401 at 401. See also JE 
Bickenbach, "Minority Rights or Universal Participation: The Politics 
of Disablement" in M Jones & LA Basser Marks, eds, Disability, 
Divers-Ability and Legal Change (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999) 
101.  
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relies.” 95  We can therefore assert that we want an 
inclusive society, and avoid explaining why we deserve it 
on the basis of an impaired identity. As Brown explains, 
this political language would recover “the moment prior 
to [one’s identity’s] own foreclosure against its want”.96 
Theorists of justice would contribute to this endeavour by 
formulating justifications for a society inclusive of DEP 
that would not capitalize on tragic or medical descriptions 
of impairments. For instance, one may develop the view 
that a fair society ought to design its institutions from the 
point of view of a diversity of human bodies, or that a fair 
society would enforce a principle of accessibility that 
would preclude requiring different people (outsiders, 
others, DEP) to normalize, or even identify, themselves 
before having access to some goods.97  
 
In practice, it is probable that both strategies 
considered above will take the form of new identity-based 
claims. This is because of the robust political tradition of 
expecting people who make disability claims to 
submissively create and maintain a pedigree of “impaired 
subject” prior to making requests to various social actors 
(the welfare state, judges, not to mention personal 
relationships). It is concretely difficult for disabled people 
                                                 
95  Wendy Brown, States of Injury (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995) at 73; Tremain, supra note 11 at 635.  
96  Brown, supra note 95 at 76.  
97  Margrit Shildrick, “Transgressing the Law with Foucault and Derrida: 
Some Reflections on Anomalous Embodiment” (2005) 47:3 Critical 
Quarterly 30; Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry, “Welcoming Monsters: 
Disability as a Liminal Legal Concept” (2017) 29:2 Yale JL & 
Human 101.  
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to avoid abiding by current frameworks expecting an 
impaired identity from them.  
 
Nonetheless, formulating these new, more 
inclusive98 identity-based claims would already constitute 
progress, if they provide grounds for claims that would 
not require discrediting oneself, 99  that is, the public 
endorsement of a stigmatized identity, tied with 
undesirable normative consequences. 100  A critical 
ontology of impairments could therefore be appropriated 
by proponents of identity politics as a tool to expand their 
understanding of an impaired identity, even without 
moving beyond identity-based claims altogether.101 I tend 
to agree with Sheila Wildeman that “an anti-identitarian 
                                                 
98  As Dianne Pothier suggests in “Connecting Grounds of 
Discrimination to Real People's Real Experiences” (2001) 13 CJWL 
37.  
99  Goffman, supra note 2 at 4.   
100  As illustrated in the work of Mosoff, supra note 23, and that of Susan 
Stefan “‘Discredited’ and ‘Discreditable’: The Search for Political 
Identity by People with Psychiatric Diagnoses” (2003) 44 Wm & 
Mary L Rev 1341.  
101  A ground to reject this suggestion, as well as the first emancipatory 
strategy of conceptualizing impairment in a more positive way, is that 
people who wish to understand or present themselves as “impaired” 
would necessarily import elements subjugating the “impaired subject” 
in their identity. (Shelley Tremain gave a similar answer to a member 
of the audience objecting that some individuals may want to endorse 
an impaired or diseased identity, after her talk “Groundwork for a 
Feminist Philosophy of Disability”, presented at the Canadian 
Philosophical Association’s 61st Annual Congress.) I would respond 
to this objection in the same way as I respond to social modelists who 
worry about the political inefficiency of a critical ontology in the 
conclusion: both approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
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ethic of resistance to epistemic violence” does not 
necessarily require “a wholesale shift from the politics of 
mental health to a post-identity politics”.102  It may not 
only lay the grounds for new political identities, but also 
for novel political uses of identity that would be a new, 
more adjustable and responsive, kind of identity politics.  
 
Better understanding impairments would not 
exempt disability theorists from also examining how 
experiences of impairment and disability relate. An 
exclusive focus on embodiment risks “marginalizing the 
sensual, discourse, and the emotions”. 103  I am not 
suggesting that impairment is any kind of new 
Archimedean standpoint that would provide stability to 
the concept of disability, but rather that (naturalized) 
abnormal embodiments are currently used unreflectively 
as such a standpoint.  
 
I do not have the space to deal extensively with a 
final objection that a critical ontology of impairment 
ought to rebut: the claim that Foucauldian and other post-
structuralist conceptions of impairments as a site of power 
and resistance leave no space for agency and freedom. 
Some believe, for instance, that Butler’s performative 
understanding of agency104  or Foucault’s conception of 
                                                 
102  Wildeman (Part II), supra note 7 at 192.  
103  Mairian Corker, “Differences, Conflations and Foundations: The 
Limits to 'Accurate' Theoretical Representation of Disabled People's 
Experience?” (1999) 14:5 Disability & Society 627 at 634.  
104  Watson, supra note 46 at 510.  
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the body105 either pre-determine the subject or render her 
passive. These criticisms have been addressed by post-
structuralist scholars. 106  In short, simply because 
structuralist and post-structuralist perspectives on agency 
investigate the strings manipulating the puppet does not 
mean that they deny the possibility of freedom; these 
perspectives may, instead, be read as qualifying the nature 
of freedom that we do possess. Moreover, this last 
challenge to a critical ontology is unlikely to faze legal 
scholars. Even if they were convinced that certain 
conceptions of power, agency or impairment are myths, 
these myths acquire political capital. In legal matters, 
success may well depend upon appealing to established 
myths rather than on ontological (dis)proofs.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has suggested ways of integrating into legal 
scholarship insights from a modest body of literature 
within disability studies that problematizes the concept of 
impairment. The central objection to developing 
emancipatory practices through a critical ontology of 
impairment is that its use as an identity marker is 
necessary to social, political, and legal struggles to foster 
the social inclusion of DEP. This objection assumes that 
traditional identitarian politics cannot continue in parallel 
to developing alternative disability discourses. This 
                                                 
105  Bill Hughes, “What Can a Foucauldian Analysis Contribute to 
Disability Theory?” in Shelley Tremain, ed, Foucault and the 
Government of Disability (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2015) 78 at 85.  
106  Butler, supra note 4 at 197–98; Tremain, supra note 11 at 634.  
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assumption is questionable: it might just as well be said 
that theoretically divergent disability discourses may feed 
off each other’s political successes. (Consider how both 
anti-discrimination ideals and universal design ideals sit 
together throughout the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.)  
 
The reward of questioning the social construction 
of impairments within medical, social and legal 
discourses, on the other hand, is real and promising. 
Scholars and practitioners would be equipped with a more 
sophisticated array of concepts to assess how DEP are 
socially excluded, not only through measures exercised 
against them but through a myriad of practices and 
discourses that construct them interpretatively as 
“impaired”. In the legal field, this “impaired legal 
subject” is positioned in ways that define and limit the 
recourses available to her. This awareness is empowering 
insofar as it provides us with further sites of resistance to 
challenge treatments of DEP that would insidiously 
reassert an identity that harms, rather than benefits, them 
and that subjugates, rather than frees, them.  
 
Tobin Siebers goes so far as to argue that an 
impaired identity has not been problematized as a social 
construct nearly as much as other minority identities. This 
would explain why its use as a tool of domination 
“remains in full force”. Race or gender, for instance, are 
typically suspicious justifications when invoked in 
circumstances implying inferiority, but the same cannot 
be said of common (e.g. tragic or compensatory) ways of 
depicting and dealing with “the disabled”:  
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[T]he prejudice against disability 107 . . . 
[provides] seemingly credible reasons for 
the belief in human inferiority and the 
oppressive systems built upon it. This usage 
will continue. . . until we reach a historical 
moment when we know as much about the 
social construction of disability as we now 
know about the social construction of race, 
class, gender, and sexuality. Disability 
represents at this moment in time the final 
frontier of justifiable human inferiority.108  
Working out the implications of the thesis that our 
bodies are sites of power and agency within legal and 
political fields that assume bodies are natural objects and 
are premised upon disembodied conceptions of power and 
agency may require radical changes. Such changes should 
not alarm social justice scholars and disability activists 
because they think these would deprive them of helpful 
categories to carry out their worthwhile struggles. On the 
contrary, if they are truly concerned with the 
emancipation of “persons with disabilities”, they cannot 
afford to ignore the fact that legal frameworks which 
seem to cater to the special needs of “people with 
                                                 
107  In this context, Siebers uses the term “disability” to mean 
“impairment” or bodily difference.  
108  Tobin Siebers, Disability Aesthetics (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2010) at 27–28. In his work on the “aesthetics of 
human disqualification”, Siebers argues that medical (and other, e.g., 
artistic) representations of impairments carry a symbolic weight that 
must be read within a history of disability aesthetics, used to 
disqualify certain people from the ranks of full human beings.  
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disabilities” are not value-neutral.109 Whether one uses the 
idiom of repressive power, ideology and stigma to detect 
ableist assumptions underlying legal norms, or the 
Foucauldian notion of regulatory power to understand 
how profoundly they control differently embodied human 
beings, 110  the point is to dislodge the concept of 
impairment from its medical pedestal. Bringing the 
                                                 
109  Shildrick, supra note 97 at 43.  
110  Foucauldian scholars may find my use of the notions of ideology and 
prejudice within an argument informed by Foucauldian insights 
somewhat out of place. This is because, by contrast to critical views 
of human sciences as a vehicle of ideology, Foucault looks at 
scientific and other discourses as creating mechanisms that collect 
and constitute knowledge through which social control is exercised. 
A focus on prejudice and ideology implicitly supposes the existence 
of a position untainted by prejudices and ideology and sends us on an 
impossible quest to find such a position that is less illuminating than 
understanding how we reached the “truths” that we now have. See 
e.g. Michel Foucault, Surveiller et Punir (France: Gallimard, 1975) at 
187 and Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power” in The Foucault 
Reader, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) at 60. See also how 
Foucault considered that his view of knowledge production could 
inform an understanding of ideology: Michel Foucault, The 
Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1972) at 185. My answer is that objecting to a 
simultaneous use of legal tools and of a critical outlook on those tools 
is far from inherently illogical (Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, 
and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at 
73). It also does not seem that Foucault himself would have been 
opposed to this politically opportunistic gleaning of his work. When 
asked “how can your writings contribute to [social] struggles?”, 
Foucault conceded that all of his books were “small toolkits” that 
anyone was welcome to use to “short-circuit, disqualify, or break 
systems of power”: Michel Foucault, Dits et Écrits 1954–1988, Vol. 
II (1970–1975) (France: Gallimard, 1994) at 720 [translated by 
author].  
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construction of its materiality under critical scrutiny will 
“permit the term to occupy and to serve very different 
political aims”, which will more than make up for the 
temporary epistemological uncertainty it may occasion.111  
 
 
                                                 
111  Butler, supra note 4 at 30.  
